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This article posits that the mechanisation of agriculture and security risks have 
significant negative effects on India’s female labour force participation rate. 
Despite remarkable economic progress in India, aggregate female labour force 
participation rate still show a declining trend since the late 1970s and traditional 
explanations such as decreasing fertility rates, rising wages and education levels 
could not completely explain this trend in female labour force participation. 
Using time-series data from 1980, we find evidence that the share of agriculture 
to the GDP, the mechanisation of agriculture, and security risks are the key 
determinants of female labour force participation. 
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Revisiting The Decline In India’s Female Labour Force Participation: 
The Rise Of Machines And Security Risks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the middle of the 20
th
 century, many countries throughout the world experienced 
significant increases in female labour force participation.  India, however, is a unique 
example as it has one of the lowest and continuously declining female labour force 
participation in the world.  This, despite the fact that India continue to experience high 
economic growth rates since the 1990s.  The rigid nature of gender inequality in 
education, employment and income; culture, traditions, low sex ratio, poor quality 
education and mismatch of skills, and lack of employment opportunities are touted as 
major hurdles facing labour force participation in India (see for example Kapsos et al. 
2014; Sorsa et al. 2015; Das et al. 2015) . This decline in female labour force 
participation raises skepticism on the continued growth of the economy. 
This study aims to revisit the factors affecting the aggregate female labour force 
participation in India since 1980. In doing so, we look at the structure of the Indian 
labour market, the status of women in general and also in rural and urban areas, 
education and health facilities, occupational segregation for men and women and the 
factors that influence women’s decision making with respect to joining the labour force.   
Our basic premise is that labour force participation is not only an outcome of supply 
factors but just as importantly, demand for labour as well.  We explore alternative 
factors that contribute to the decline in female labour force participation in India.  
Specifically, we examine the role of Indian agriculture and its mechanisation in 
affecting the division of labour between the two sexes in the rural areas, as well as the 
extent to which security risk for females affect labour force participation – a first, to the 
best of our knowledge in this literature.  We hypothesise that as India’s agriculture 
sector transitioned from manual to mechanical and from traditional to modern methods 
 
 
of cultivation, demand for female workers decrease, at the same time, females are 
forced to withdraw from the labour force in rural areas.  Further, as India’s urban female 
labour force has been almost stationary since the last three decades, the net decline in 
the national female labour force participation comes from rural areas.  We also 
hypothesise that security risks that discourage females from entering the labour force 
significantly affect the overall participation rate. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Female labour force participation has received considerable attention from labour, 
development economist and policy makers, especially since economic empowerment of 
women is considered crucial to growth (Klugman et al. 2014) and it is common 
consensus that education is the first step towards empowerment. The structural 
transition experienced by economies demands higher skills which in turn give higher 
returns, encouraging individual and institutions to invest in human capital (Heckman, 
2000; Blöndal et al. 2002).  Goldin (1995) argues that the correlation between economic 
development and female labour force participation changes with the level of 
development. She suggests that correlation would take a U-shape – that female labour 
force participation exhibits a downward trend in the beginning of the development 
process due to a transfer from home production or domestic duties to the formal labour 
market which require human capital skills. However, uneducated or low educated 
women can only do labour or manual work in their family farm, which carries a strong 
social stigma, e.g., manual work is socially undesirable, therefore women are more 
likely to opt out of the labour force.  Further, during the early development stage, 
education opportunities expand for females, and this, along with increasing returns to 
education, encourages the illiterate and low skilled female labour force away from the 
labour market towards gaining an education. She concludes that as the economy 
 
 
develops further with more females gaining education, increasing their ability to 
compete for higher positions, female labour force participation rate begins to rise and 
this contributes to the upward portion of the U-shape.  Sundaram and Venneman (2008) 
find a positive relationship between literacy level of females and labour force 
participation.  
Das and Desai (2003), Gaddis and Klasen (2014) and Lahoti and Swaminathan (2013), 
among others, raise questions on the validity of the U-shaped hypothesis.  Das and 
Desai (2003) state that female labour force in India has not experienced feminisation 
like other South East Asian countries, since for several decades, they remained at the 
bottom of the U-shape despite substantial growth in GDP.  They investigate the labour 
market behavior of educated women aged 20-55 years in India, using data from the 
National Sample Survey (NSS) for 1993-1994. They test the structural opportunity 
hypothesis through socio-economic status, education level of villages and blocks, which 
are expected to affect the labour market decision of women. They use caste as a proxy 
for cultural values. They also use an interaction term for caste and education. The 
dependent dummy variable is employment status. Their results show that education has 
a negative effect on labour participation, while lower caste people with children under 
five years of age are more likely to be employed. These findings appear contrary to the 
general literature, but in India, lower caste women work because they need to. Further, 
women are less likely to be employed despite having an education due to increasing 
competition for jobs. This is consistent with the previous literature and they imply that 
education must be accompanied by growth in employment opportunities. The 




Gaddis and Klasen (2014), using data on female labour force participation from a 
variety of sources like the International Labour Organisation’s estimates and projections 
and from different versions of the Penn World Tables (revisions 4th, 5th, and 6th of 
PWT versions 6.3 and 6.7), find that the U-shaped hypothesis motivated by secular 
patterns of structural change is weak or solely dependent on the data used for the 
analysis.  
Similarly, Lahoti and Swaminathan (2013) re-examine the U-shaped hypothesis in the 
context of the Indian economy. They use state level panel data (1983-2010) to 
investigate the relationship between economic development and female labour force 
participation rate. Their methodology and estimation techniques are similar to Gaddis 
and Klasen (2014), and they found no evidence for the U- shaped relationship between 
economic growth and female labour force participation rate. Their results show that the 
decline in the female labour force participation in India does not show any sign of 
upturn with higher growth. They claim that economic growth is not accompanied by 
employment growth. Moreover, their results indicate that the Indian economy appear to 
have bypassed the manufacturing sector in its structural transition. India experienced a 
sharp decline in the share of value added by the agriculture sector while the 
manufacturing sector did not show any significant increase in its share. The service 
sector has emerged as the largest contributor to growth. However, the service sector 
requires skills for which majority of women are not trained due to social, cultural and 
traditional constraints. The unbalanced sectoral growth, lack of quality education, social 
and religious constraints are some hurdles in the way of not only a better socio-
economic status for women, but participation in the labour market as well.  
Klasen and Pieters (2015) attempt to identify the forces that cause the stagnation of 
female labour force participation rate in urban India since late 1987. They use micro 
 
 
level data from 1987 to 2011. They limit their sample to married women aged 25-54. 
They suggest that a combination of demand and supply side factors contribute to the 
stagnation of female labour force participation. Male income and education reduces 
female labour force participation. The positive effect of higher education (tertiary) is 
moderated by opposing factors like social constraints. They also claim that the 
counteractive effect of social stigma seems to decline from 2009. On the other hand, 
demand side structural change could not create enough employment opportunities to 
absorb a growing female working-age population. Employment growth in urban India is 
confined to construction and low-skilled services, which benefitted men due to the 
stigma effect for women in low-skilled jobs. Ghani et al. (2013) suggest that political 
empowerment of women is a useful tool to increase both the demand for and supply of 
labour market opportunities for women. It can be a potential policy tool to tackle the 
declining trend of female labour force participation in India. They examine the direct 
(allocating more employment to women in public works) and indirect (facilitating 
female labour force participation) effect of female political representatives on labour 
market outcomes. They claim that an additional year of exposure to female political 
representatives across all local government levels increase the female labour force 
participation by 17.5%. Moreover, having a female leader at district level increases this 
outcome by 8%.       
Neff et al. (2012) examine the decline in female labour force participation in rural India 
from 2004 to 2010 using NSS data.  They find that the working age 15-24 constitutes 
only 29% of the total labour force because most in this age group are in 
school/university.  The same trend is observed for urban women, and education appears 
to be a strong reason for the decline in labour participation. Their analysis further 
indicates that the income effect from male income reduces the supply of female labour. 
 
 
They find no evidence that employment opportunities and social and cultural factors 
affect the declining labour force participation; hence they conclude that the decline is 
mainly due to the income effect (from male income) and partially due to education. 
  Sorsa et al. (2015) state that employment opportunities in agriculture have 
declined in India, and other low skilled jobs benefit men. Moreover, education (except 
tertiary) and labour force participation rate are negatively related. The study analyses 
the various determinants of female labour force participation under four broad 
categories: individual characteristics, household characteristics, district characteristics 
and state characteristics by using various rounds of data conducted by the National 
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO).  Their regression results show that socio-cultural 
factors like marriage has a stronger negative effect on the labour force participation of 
women; Muslim women are less likely to enter the labour force while Christianity has a 
positive influence on female participation. The negative effect of a husband’s income 
appears to diminish from 1987 to 2012 but remains negative nonetheless. Household 
head with a university degree lowers the probability of female participation by five 
percentage points in rural areas, and by 13 percentage points in urban areas.  Number of 
children and labour force participation are negatively correlated, but only for urban 
women. It is common that parents and parents-in-law decide the female’s role in the 
family and the labour market and the results show that the family has a strong negative 
influence on females’ labour market decisions. Access to financial services like having 
a personal bank account and access to credit, etc. increases the female labour force 
participation by 0.22 percentage points. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The key aim of our study is to investigate different dimensions of female labour force 
supply and demand. We focus on studying how sectoral transformation contributes to 
 
 
the decline in the female labour force participation. We develop our study based on the 
neoclassical model of supply and Becker’s Household Model (1991) to grasp the 
behaviour of individuals and households in labour market decisions. We also adopt 
Boserup’s (1970) theory in understanding the role of women in economic development, 
which in turn helps determine the demand for labour.   
 
Neoclassical Model of Labour Supply 
The basic neoclassical model of labour supply deals with individual labour supply 
decisions and is not influenced by other individuals.  Becker (1991) expanded the 
neoclassical model of labour supply in two ways by considering a household 
perspective and allowing for multiple uses of time and time usage for commodities. The 
model assumes the household as the decision-making unit, rather than the individual. 
Decision-making is interdependent and influenced by the activities of other family 
members. Family members maximise their utility subject to time and budget constraints. 
A female’s decision to work may depend on whether the male members are employed.  
The whole idea of the model revolves around the comparative advantage and gains from 
specialisation, i.e., that every agent should specialise in that good or service which it 
can produce at a relatively lower cost. The theory suggests that utility can be maximised 
when family members specialise in market or household production according to their 
comparative advantage. The model explains that division of labour by gender in all the 
societies is partly due to gains from specialisation and comparative advantage and partly 
due to biological differences. Women are biologically committed to production and 
feeding of children. Consequently, biological differences explain why women invest in 
human capital that raises household productivity with respect to caring for children. 
Conversely, men spend most of their working time in the market, so they invest in 
 
 
capital that raises their market efficiency. If all the members allocate their time to their 
specialised sector, the total returns to the household will be higher. 
However, while the decision to work outside the home is a household decision, 
Sudarshan and Bhattacharya (2009) observed that safety concerns are also a key factor 
influencing female participation in the labour market.  Due to numerous reports of 
crimes against women, women feel uneasy about joining the workforce and leaving the 
security of their home.  Mobility and safety concerns are frequently cited as huge 
obstacles to working, and must also be factored in the analysis. 
 
Boserup’s Theory: Women’s Role in Economic Development 
In regions of plough cultivation, the division of labour between the two sexes was due 
to shifting cultivation practices. The main farming instruments, like the plough was 
used with big animals like the ox, were used by men and women were relegated to 
manual farm work without any tools or implements. Most of the Asian regions in 
Boserup’s sample show male dominance in agriculture because a large number of 
women were also exempted from work in the fields (for religious reasons or tradition in 
some societies), and women perform only domestic duties.   
Boserup also looks at reasons why employers prefer male workers in industries. Laws 
that provide obligatory benefits for female workers, e.g., maternity leave, not permitted 
to work at night and in underground mines,  result in preference for males in the bigger 
industries, because it appears more profitable to employ male workers (without as many 
mandated benefits) than female workers.  Women also appear to prefer flexible working 
hours, which is possible in home or cottage industries where they are able to carry out 
domestic duties in between work hours. In many developing countries, working in home 
industries is also preferred to avoid contact with men from outside their own household. 
 
 
In India and Pakistan for instance, factory work is not regarded as respectable work for 
women. These cultural and personal preferences lower the position of women in the 
labour market. 
Boserup observes that in many developing countries, women are rarely trained for 
skilled jobs while male workers undergo vocational and on the job training. Women are 
considered as the weaker sex in the society, so they are unsuitable for work in heavy 
industries and are unable to work for longer hours. As a result, men hold most of the 
skilled jobs in industry and trade. Moreover, migration from rural to urban areas causes 
changes in women’s activities. Subsistence activities in urban areas often disappear as a 
large part of home-produced goods is replaced by purchases from the market. Women, 
having no modern skills for industries (in the urban areas) are therefore confined to 
domestic activities; hence, female labour force participation is higher in rural areas than 
in urban areas. This kind of labour force participation is observed in India and Africa.  
Boserup’s idea that women are intrinsically inferior workers remains dominant in 
developing and developed countries. As a result, women seek security by escaping 
competition with men by sticking to more “feminine” professions (like teaching, 
secretarial work, etc.). Developing countries have launched programs to train women in 
crafts (e.g., hand-spinning in India) which may be first entry step into the labour market. 
However, this kind of program does not prepare women to compete in modern labour 
markets where employers seek more skills.  This is particularly important as farming in 
India becomes more mechanised, farm labour in general tends to be displaced (see for 
example, Reddy et al. 2014); and if females are less skilled in the use of farm 







We analyse the aggregate female labour force participation rate in India by using data 
from the World Development Indicators, International Labour Organisation and the 
National Crime Records Bureau of India. We use time series data from 1980 to 2013. 
Based on the previous review of literature, our analysis examines how the 
mechanisation of agriculture and the number of rape cases reported during the period of 
1980-2013 can be important determinants of female labour force participation in India, 
controlling for the percentage share of agriculture to GDP, the ratio of female to male 
secondary education, female labour force participation rate, male labour force 
participation rate and real GDP per capita as important determinants of female labour 
force participation.  A plot of each variable in levels is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 Female labour force participation rate (FLPR): Female labour force participation 
rate is the centre of our analysis. We collected labour force data from ILO and 
WDI (2007).  According to ILO, the labour force participation rate is calculated 
by expressing number of persons active (employed or looking for work) in the 
labour market as a percentage of the working age population. In our analysis, the 
age range is 15-64 years. The female labour force participation rate in India has 
declined from 47.11% in 1980 to 28.5% in 2013. 
 Agriculture value added percentage of GDP (AVA): Share of value added is an 
explanatory variable in our analysis. The AVA data is obtained from the World 
Bank database. The share of agriculture in India has declined by 19% since 
1980. The average growth rate during this period is 3.5% which is mainly driven 




 Mechanisation of Agriculture (MECH): We are using the number of tractors as a 
proxy for the mechanisation of agriculture. The data is consolidated from WDI 
(2007) and Mehta et al. (2014). 
 
 
 Number of Rape Cases Reported (RISK): We include the number of rape cases 
reported as a proxy for security risks and safety concerns facing working 
women. The data is available from the National Crime Records Bureau of India. 
We assume rapes as a suitable proxy for risks because these incidents are the 
root cause of fear and create a feeling of insecurity in society for females. 
Security risks lead the households to constrain women from entering the labour 
market.  
 Male labour force participation rate (MLPR): We include MLPR as a control 
variable. We believe that more males in the labour market negatively affects 
female labour force participation rate. Moreover, the employed male could also 
indicate some information about these household head’s income which is 
negatively correlated with FLPR.  
 Ratio of female to male secondary education (EDU): Education is another 
control variable. We prefer to use the ratio of female to male secondary 
education to capture the effect of male and female education on FLPR. The 
literature suggests that female education (up to secondary schooling) has a 
negative effect on male education. On the other hand, the rising number of 
educated males indicates that males are able to capture more opportunities as 
evidenced by the dominance of males in the labour market and preference of 
employers for male employees. The number of females in secondary education 
is lower than males but it is improving due to rising returns to education. The 
ratio rose from 49% in 1980 to 95% in 2013. 
 Real GDP per capita (RGDPC): We also include income to control for the 




It is evident from Figure 1 that each variable (in level) exhibits a trend, and could 
possibly be non-stationary. For instance, female labour force participation rate (Figure 
1a) and the share of agriculture in GDP (Figure 1b) are rapidly declining; the male 
labour force participation rate (Figure 1f) shows a sluggish decline; the number of 
tractors (Figure 1c) – a proxy for mechanisation of agriculture, the number of rape cases 
reported (Figure 1d) – a proxy for security risks. the ratio of female to male secondary 
education (Figure 1e) and real GDP per capita (Figure 1g) all exhibit a rising trend. 
Hendry (1980) warns about using OLS for non-stationary series. OLS requires all 
variables to be stationary otherwise the results will be spurious regressions. There is a 
possibility that two unrelated series are highly correlated and significant but one must 
remain cautious of an irrelevant relation between them. Therefore, we test our variables 
of interest according to their nature. 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
Testing for time series properties 
Elder and Kennedy (2001) suggest that regressing two variables with unit roots give us 
spurious results with misleading t-statistics and R-squares and very low Durbin- Watson 
statistics. To avoid misleading results, we test the variables for unit roots.  
A time series is stationary if its joint distribution is time invariant, i.e., the mean and 
variance do not depend on time. Stationarity is determined by order of integration. If a 
variable is of zero order of integration, it is stationary or I(0), and if it is of higher order 
of integration, it is non- stationary. Traditional econometric techniques suggest that we 
need to difference the variable to get stationarity. The order of integration depends on 
how many times we need to difference the variable to it make it stationary.  We use the 
 
 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) test for unit roots and the 
Schwarz’ Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) to select the maximum number of lags.   
The plot of each variable below (Figure 2) exhibits an obvious upward or downward 
trend. The variables lnAVA (log share of agriculture in GDP) and lnFLPR (log female 
labour participation rate) are declining; lnMLPR (log male labour force participation 
rate) shows a small decline and the remaining three:  lnEDU (log ratio of female to male 
sec education), lnRISK (security risks), lnMECH (log number of tractors) and lnRGDPC 
(log of real GDP per capita) display an upward trend. Based on these observations, we 
use an autoregressive equation with constant and trend for each variable for testing for 
unit roots. 
The results from the ADF tests (Table 1) show that all the variables are I(1) and 























ADF Unit Root Test Results 
 
Variable Levels First 
Difference 
Order 
lnAVA -1.845 -3.295** I(1) 
lnFLPR -0.688 -2.822** I(1) 
lnMLPR -0.214 -3.196** I(1) 
lnEDU -1.642 -9.472*** I(1) 
lnRISK -1.889 -4.126** I(1) 
lnMECHAGRI -2.884 -5.620*** I(1) 
lnRGDPC -0.761 -3.564 I(1) 
 
Notes:  
*** and ** reject the null hypothesis at the 1% and 5% significance level based on 
McKinnon asymptotic (1990, 2010) critical values. 
 
Since all the individual variables are non-stationary, we check for cointegration using 
Engle and Granger’s two-step method (Engle and Granger, 1987). This method is based 
on ADF test and OLS regressions. The residuals are obtained from the OLS regressions. 
ADF tests are then conducted on the OLS residuals. Our OLS model for labour force 
participation is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1ln𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡 +




𝑢𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡𝛼1 −  β1𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑡 − 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑡 − 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡 − 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡 −
𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡 − 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡            (2) 
 
The obtained residuals are regressed on their lagged term as follows: 
𝑢𝑡 =  𝛼u𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡         (3) 
 
The null H0:  = 1 implies that ut is I(1), i.e., there is no cointegration. Alternative H1: 
 < 1 implies that ut is I(0), i.e., cointegration exists. 
The different lag selection criteria (LR, AIC, HQIC and FPE) suggest the use of two 
lags to test for cointegration.  
 
The Engle Granger tests (Table 2) do not reject the null, implying that there is no 
cointegration between LFPR and the explanatory variables, hence, we use a Vector 




Engle Granger Test for Co-integration 
 






Z(t) -2.588 -6.499 -5.617 -5.193 
 
Notes:  





VAR estimation requires stationary time series but since our variables of interest are 
I(1), we conduct our VAR analysis on first differences. Two lags are incorporated in the 
model following the AIC and HQIC lag selection criterion.  The following models are 
specified: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐿𝑃𝑅 = ∝1 +  𝛽11∆lnFLPR𝑡−1 + 𝛽12∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡−2 +  𝛽13∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 +
𝛽14∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡−2 + 𝛽15∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛽16∆lnEDU𝑡−2 + 𝛽17∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑡−1 +
𝛽18∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑡−2 + 𝛽19∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝛽110∆ln𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾t−2 + β111∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−1 +
𝛽112∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−2 + β113∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽114∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−2 +𝜀1𝑡  (4) 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑉𝐴 = ∝2 + 𝛽21∆lnAVA𝑡−1 + 𝛽22∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑡−2  +  𝛽23∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 +
𝛽24∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡−2 + 𝛽25∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑡−1 + β26∆lnEDUt−2 + 𝛽27∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 +
𝛽28∆𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑡−2 + 𝛽29∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝛽210∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡−2 + 𝛽211∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−1 +
𝛽212∆𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−2 + β213∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽214∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−2 +𝜀2𝑡         (5) 
 
We specify a similar model for the rest of the variables.  
 
Equation (4) is our model of interest. We expect female labour force participation rate 
(FLPR) to be negatively correlated with the ratio of female and male secondary 
education (EDU) , male labour force participation rate (MLPR), past values of security 
risks (𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾) and  the mechanisation of agriculture. On the other hand, we expect 
positive coefficients on real GDP per capita and the share of agriculture in GDP because 





We perform Granger causality tests to investigate reverse causality in the variables of 
interest. Granger causality examines whether past values of one or more variables cause 
another variable. In other words, the test determines whether past values of one variable 
can help in the prediction of another variable in the model.  For example, in equation 
(4), a significant  coefficient rejects the null of no causality and we conclude that that 
particular variable Granger-causes LFPR.  For bi-directional causality, the coefficients 
of the two variables being analysed in the presence of other factors (i.e., other 
regressors) should be jointly significant. 
 
The results from the Granger causality tests (Table 3) show that we cannot reject the 
null that dlnAVA dlnMLPR and dlnRGDPC do not Granger-cause dlnLFPR, i.e., that 
changes in the share of agriculture in GDP, male labour participation rate and real GDP 
per capita do not help us predict changes in the female labour force participation rate. 
On the other hand, we find that education, security risk, and mechanisation of 
agriculture Granger-causes female labour force participation. However, the results show 
that jointly, causality runs from all the explanatory variables to female labour force 
participation. The models for dlnAVA, dlnEDU and dlnMLPR show that causality runs 
from the change in female labour force participation to the change in share of 










Granger Causality Test Results (H0: no causality) 
Equation Excluded Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
dlnLFPR dlnAVA 4.8258 2 0.090 
dlnLFPR dlnEDU 11.228 2 0.004 
dlnLFPR dlnRISK 8.3857 2 0.015 
dlnLFPR dlnMLPR 5.2721 2 0.072 
dlnLFPR dlnMECH 35.202 2 0.000 
dlnLFPR dlnRGPDC 3.0016 2 0.223 
dlnLFPR ALL 75.196 12 0.000 
dlnAVA dlnLFPR 16.06 2 0.000 
dlnAVA dlnEDU 0.9086 2 0.635 
dlnAVA dlnRISK 0.9550 2 0.620 
dlnAVA dlnMLPR 2.6067 2 0.272 
dlnAVA dlnMECH 4.2176 2 0.121 
dlnAVA dlnRGPDC 0.6938 2 0.707 
dlnAVA ALL 23.341 12 0.025 
dlnEDU dlnLFPR 8.5752 2 0.014 
dlnEDU dlnAVA 0.1785 2 0.915 
dlnEDU dlnRISK 35.784 2 0.000 
dlnEDU dlnMLPR 1.7474 2 0.417 
dlnEDU dlnMECH 0.8043 2 0.669 
dlnEDU dlnRGPDC 5.6244 2 0.060 






TABLE 3 (continued) 
Equation Excluded Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
dlnRISK dlnLFPR 1.0931 2 0.579 
dlnRISK dlnAVA 2.5473 2 0.280 
dlnRISK dlnEDU 1.0245 2 0.599 
dlnRISK dlnMLPR 2.0557 2 0.358 
dlnRISK dlnMECH 3.1987 2 0.202 
dlnRISK dlnRGPDC 1.7832 2 0.410 
dlnRISK ALL 18.195 12 0.110 
dlnMLPR dlnLFPR 9.3229 2 0.009 
dlnMLPR dlnAVA 3.2435 2 0.198 
dlnMLPR dlnEDU 8.4563 2 0.015 
dlnMLPR DlnRISK 9.5863 2 0.008 
dlnMLPR dlnMECH 12.248 2 0.002 
dlnMLPR dlnRGPDC 4.4719 2 0.107 
dlnMLPR ALL 44.435 12 0.000 
dlnMECH dlnLFPR 0.07432 2 0.964 
dlnMECH dlnAVA 0.77239 2 0.680 
dlnMECH dlnEDU 1.0405 2 0.594 
dlnMECH dlnRISK 0.9177 2 0.632 
dlnMECH dlnMLPR 0.20659 2 0.902 
dlnMECH dlnRGPDC 2.5984 2 0.273 






TABLE 3 (continued) 
Equation Excluded Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
dlnRGDPC dlnLFPR 2.6859 2 0.261 
dlnRGDPC dlnAVA 5.6544 2 0.059 
dlnRGDPC dlnEDU 1.2876 2 0.525 
dlnRGDPC dlnRISK 10.682 2 0.005 
dlnRGDPC dlnMLPR 4.8787 2 0.087 
dlnRGDPC dlnMECH 18.63 2 0.000 
dlnRGDPC ALL 37.474 12 0.000 
 
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Estimation of the VAR model (Table 4) for female labour force participation rate shows 
that the sign of the coefficients on the lagged dlnAVA are contrary to our hypothesis and 
they are not significant. The coefficient on the education variable (dlnEDU) at lag one is 
negative, as expected, and significant at the 5% level. We find that a 1% change in the 
ratio of female and male secondary education causes a 26% decline in the change in 
female labour participation rate. The relationship between male and female labour force 
participation rate is negative but it is marginally significant at the 10% level. 
Mechanisation of agriculture has a negative impact on female labour force participation 
rate. Mechanisation of agriculture causes a 28% decline in the change in female labour 
force participation rate in India. This finding is consistent with the results of a study by 
Reddy et al. (2014), which show that mechanisation in the farm replaces labour. 
We test the model for stability and for autocorrelation of the residuals. We examine 
whether or not the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. In other words the modules 
should be less than 1.  We find that the VAR system is stable as the eigenvalues 
 
 
stability condition is met as the modules for all eigenvalues are less than 1. We also 
perform the Lagrange–Multiplier Test to examine autocorrelation of the residuals, and 
find that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals. 
 
Our results show that the mechanisation of agriculture has played a negative role in 
explaining female labour force participation in India.  We have examined both the 
demand and supply side hypotheses. 
 Demand side Hypothesis: That the declining share of agriculture in GDP leads to 
lower employment opportunities for females.  In particular, there is less demand 
for females who perform manual because of the mechanisation of agriculture. 
Our study supports this mechanisation hypothesis.   
 Supply side Hypothesis: That security risks that limit freedom of movement of 
females (e.g., fear of being raped while on the way to/from work) discourages 
female labour force participation.  Moreover, both male and female education 
and male labour force participation rates have negative impacts on female labour 
force supply. The research presented above supports the security risks and 
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Standard errors in parentheses         * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
We find that mechanisation of agriculture has a strong negative impact both on female 
labour force demand and supply in many ways. On the demand side, it replaces man 
power and animal power in the agriculture sector. The introduction of the tractor is 
always accompanied by other allied machinery.  Most of the manual jobs, like weeding 
and winnowing, for females have disappeared from the agriculture sector. The 
dominance of men in using equipment (see for example Boserup, 1970) in agriculture 
forces females to withdraw from the labour force when mechanisation ensues. Our 
results show that female labour force participation rate declined by 28% (Table 4) due 
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opportunities for women (Das and Desai, 2003). Mechanisation was also accompanied 
by the introduction of high yielding crop varieties, modern means of irrigation, 
pesticides and use of electric power for irrigation. These changes enhance the 
productivity of labour (particularly male labour force) and societal belief that females 
are less productive reduces the demand for female labour in the agriculture sector. 
Further, the agriculture sector in India has transformed from subsistence to commercial. 
Increased production of crops (grains) and commercialisation strengthen the economic 
position of households. Rising household income leads to less work or reduction in 
labour supply (income effect) particularly for females in the Indian society which 
constrains female labour force participation to preserve the social status of the family.  
The results from the VAR model for male labour force participation rate clearly indicate 
that mechanisation has a highly statistically significant positive effect on male labour 
participation rate and MLPR increases by 2%, consistent with the findings in other 
studies (e.g., Boserup, 1970). 
Agriculture and its mechanisation are at the centre of our argument.  We propose that 
changes in the agriculture sector have a dominant role in explaining the decline in the 
overall female labour force participation rate in India. We note that 67% of India’s total 
population live in the rural areas where agriculture and its allied occupations (poultry 
farming, dairy farming) are the major economic activities.  In India, urban female 
labour force participation rate has stagnated and remain very low (around 20%) since 
1987 (Klasen and Pieters, 2015). On the other hand rural female labour force 
participation has declined from 52% in 1993 to 39.9% in 2010 (Neff et al. 2012).   This 
implies that the overall decline in female labour force participation can be attributed 
largely to the decline in rural (agricultural) labour force participation.  Further, jobs in 
urban areas, particularly in the fastest-growing service sector still could not generate 
 
 
enough employment opportunities to  absorb a growing working age population, hence 
labour force participation remain stagnant in urban areas as mentioned previously.  As 
well, the service sector is dominated by transport, trade, IT and financial services, all of 
which require skills that majority of females do not have. From the total female working 
age population, 37.7% is illiterate, 8% has completed senior secondary and only 6.8 % 
has a bachelor degree or higher. It is even more shocking to see that only 0.04% of 
working age females has a technical certificate or diploma (Census of India, 2011).  For 
this reason, among others, employment opportunities in the growing service sector and 
industry largely benefit men due to the gender gap in level and quality of education 
between males and females in India. 
Aside from constraints from the demand side (e.g., male workers are preferred over 
females because males can use farm machinery and/or are more educated than females), 
there are also many constraints from the supply side. We argue that security risks 
contribute negatively to female labour force participation rate in India. Social norms and 
traditions make security risks a hindrance for females in entering the labour market. We 
incorporate number of rape cases reported in the VAR model and the results are 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the lagged security risk variable (RISK). The 
results show that security risks cause an 11% decline in the change (Table 4) in the 
female labour force participation rate. The proxy for security risks affects the female 
labour force participation at the second lag as expected because the victims and families 
try not to disclose these kinds of tragedies for the sake of maintaining their family’s 
honour in the face of society. After some time, no secret can be kept hidden forever, 
they are eventually disclosed which then causes fears of security risks that discourages 
females from going out and/or being in contact with unfamiliar men in the labour 
market.  Consistent with the findings of Sudarhsan and Bhattacharya (2009), we find 
 
 
that security risk is a key reason why women prefer to work in the home or small 
cottage industries rather than in a factory as their families do not want them to have 
contact with unfamiliar men. 
Labour force supply is also negatively affected by family decisions and household 
income. We include ratio of female to male secondary education (dlnEDU) and male 
labour force participation rate (dlnMLPR) to capture the effect of education stigma, 
social stigma and household effect on female labour force participation rate in India. 
Our results show that male labour force participation has a substantial large negative 
impact on female labour force participation rate but it is marginally statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The negative effect of education on female labour force 
participation rate is consistent with the literature. The inclusion of the ratio of female 
and male education allows us to capture multiple effects on female labour force 
participation rate. The rising ratio can be interpreted as a move of the female population 
away from the labour market towards gaining education which we refer to as the 
education effect.  The ratio of female to male secondary education can also indicate 
gender inequality. Although the ratio has been rising over the sample period, female 
school enrolment remain far below that of male enrolment.  Educated males are more 
likely to join the labour force. The VAR model for male labour force participation rate 
shows that education causes a 2% increase in male labour force participation rate 
(MLPR) which in turn increases the household head’s income. Due to the (household) 
income effect, females tend to withdraw from the labour force. The results of this study 
are consistent with Neff et al. (2012) who find that rising household income lowers the 
female labour force participation rate.  The family unit is a dominant and important 
institution in Indian Society. It is a tradition that women specialise in domestic duties. 
Families typically make labour market decisions for their members based on traditions 
 
 
like this.  Our results are consistent with the argument that male education, that leads to 
higher male (household) incomes and female labour participation rates are negatively 
correlated. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
India has been experiencing rapid economic growth over several decades, yet female 
labour force still shows a declining trend over this rapid growth period. We explore the 
possible causes of this decline in labour force participation. Our results, suggest that 
both demand and supply side factors contribute to the decline in female labour force 
participation rate.  
We find that mechanisation of agriculture causes a decline in the demand for female 
labour force, as males are preferred over females to work with farm machinery. Our 
findings also show the need for policy makers to review existing policies of gender 
equality and to examine how effective these policies are at the grassroots level. We find 
that the education level of females remain far below that of males to enable females to 
meet the labour market requirements for more skilled workers. What is required is for 
both quantity and quality of female education to be raised. There is a pressing need in 
India to revamp the formal education system which follows an outdated centuries old 
structure that does not essentially meet the labour market requirements. Formal 
education does not guarantee jobs in the labour market. Education providers should 
promote adult education for males and females that develops and enhances technical 
skills that match current labour market requirements, including for instance training in 
the use of farm machinery for agriculture. The reduction of inherent social restrictions 
in the society for females is also of utmost important for a country like India.  
 
 
Policy makers should take advantage of information technology to educate females 
living in the remote areas and those whose mobility is restricted due to security risks to 
enable them to participate in the labour market.   Strict enforcement of laws that secure 
the mobility and safety of females and ensure justice for victims can also help 
encourage females to join the labour force. 
Our study also point toward the need for rural and urban development to occur 
simultaneously. Rural areas (particularly agriculture and its allied occupations) provide 
employment opportunities to a large portion of the population. Moreover, female 
participation rate is highest in agriculture among all the sectors. Modernisation of 
agriculture needs to progress in such a way that it can generate equal employment 
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